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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the district court abused its discretion when it granted a 
preliminary injunction requiring Defendant to refrain from: ( 1) soliciting current Alterra 
independent contractors to terminate their contracts with Alterra and (2) disclosing 
information he was obligated, by contract and statute, to keep confidential. 
Standard of Review: A reviewing court does not disturb the grant or denial of a 
preliminary injunction "'unless the court abused its discretion or rendered a decision 
clearly against the weight of the evidence."' Zagg, Inc. v. Harmer, 2015 UT App 52, , 4, 
345 P.3d 1273 (quoting Miller v. Martineau & Co., 1999 UT App 216, ~ 26, 983 P.2d 
1107); see also Aquagen Int'!, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 412-13 (Utah 1998). 
A party challenging the facts or factual findings of the district court must first 
"marshal" or summarize all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ~ 20 n.5, 217 P.3d 733. 
Preservation: Larson's brief indicates that he preserved each issue addressed in 
his brief in his Objection to Proposed Order. That is not correct. Larson's Objection to 
Proposed Order contains only objections and revisions to the language of the order, it 
does not object to the court's reasoning. However, Larson did preserve the issues raised 
in this appeal during the two-day preliminary injunction hearing. R.000813-14. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
Determinative statutes and rules include Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A( e ), and 
Utah Code Ann.§§ 13-24-2(4), 13-24-8. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A( e ), grounds for a preliminary injunction: 
(e) Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon 
a showing by the applicant that: 
(e)(l) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
( e )(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage 
the proposed order or injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined; 
( e )(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public 
interest; and 
( e )( 4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the 
merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents serious issues on the merits 
which should be the subject of further litigation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4), definition of "trade secret": 
( 4) "Trade secret" means infonnation, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process, that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-8, effect on other law: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this chapter displaces conflicting tort, 
restitutionary, and other law of this state providing civil remedies for 
misappropriation of a trade secret. 
(2) This chapter does not affect: 
(a) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a 
trade secret; 
(b) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade 
secret; or 
( c) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a 
trade secret. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an interlocutory appeal from the district court's grant of a limited 
preliminary injunction that prohibits Defendant Jeff Larson ("Larson"), a former 
salesman and independent contractor with Plaintiff Alterra, LLC ("Alterra"), from 
soliciting his former colleagues to break their contracts with Alterra and join a competing 
summer sales company. Larson began working for Alterra in late summer 2012 and 
signed contracts in 2012, 2013, and 2014 that contained, among other things, non-
solicitation and non-disclosure provisions whereby Larson agreed that he would not 
solicit Alterra's sales representatives to work for other summer sales companies, would 
not disclose or make unauthorized use of Alterra representatives' contact information, 
and would not disclose Alterra representatives' specific compensation plans. 
Larson was a successful sales representative and rose to become a regional sales 
manager. During the fall of 2014, Alterra gave him advance payments of $7,000 per 
month, and an additional $5,000 advance at Larson's request, with the expectation that he 
would earn well over that amount in commissions during the 2015 summer sales season. 
Alterra also paid Larson $23,169.79 in bonuses based on his commitment to perform his 
duties as a regional sales manager to recruit and sell for the full 2015 summer sales 
season. In January 2015, Larson terminated his contract with Alterra and joined a 
competing summer sales company, Vivint, Inc. ("Vivint"). Despite his promise not to 
disclose certain information or solicit away Alterra representatives, Larson gave Vivint 
the private cell phone numbers of key Alterra sales representatives and began working 
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with Vivint to convince those key leaders and others to break their contracts with Alterra 
and work for Vivint instead. Larson made unauthorized use of the contact information 
and disclosed specific compensation plans for certain Alterra representatives. Alterra 
filed suit in Fourth District Court and sought a preliminary injunction requiring Larson to 
refrain from soliciting Alterra' s sales representatives and disclosing contact and specific 
compensation information. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Alterra filed suit and requested a preliminary injunction on January 23, 2015, 
shortly after learning that Larson had joined a competing summer sales company and was 
actively recruiting Alterra's other independent contractors. On January 30, the district 
court held a hearing on Alterra's request for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). The 
court orally granted the TRO on January 30, 2015, and ordered Larson to refrain from 
soliciting Alterra's former, current, and prospective sales representatives; the court 
defined prospective representatives as those currently negotiating with Alterra. 
On February 11 and 12, the court held a two-day preliminary injunction hearing 
where it heard evidence on the nature of Alterra's business, Alterra's dependence on its 
sales force, Alterra' s efforts to recruit and train sales representatives, the contracts 
between Larson and Alterra, Larson's solicitation of Alterra's key sales representatives 
and others, Larson's disclosure of private cell phone numbers for Alterra' s sales 
representatives, and Larson's disclosure of specific compensation plans for certain 
current sales representatives. After reviewing the evidence, the district court orally 
granted a limited preliminary injunction enjoining Larson from soliciting current Alterra 
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sales representatives, disclosing private cell phone numbers obtained through Alterra, and 
disclosing specific compensation information. The court entered a written order on 
March 5, 2015. 
On March 24, 2015, Larson filed a petition for interlocutory appeal; it was 
transferred to the Court of Appeals on March 30, 2015. This Court invited Alterra to 
respond to the petition on April 17 and Alterra filed its response, opposing the petition, 
on May 1, 2015. The Court granted the petition for interlocutory appeal on May 19, 
2015. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
1. Alterra is a summer sales company that recruits and trains college-age adults to 
sell environmentally-responsible pest control products door to door. R.000813, Feb. 11 
Hrg. Tr. at 38:16-39:7, 75:12-14. 
2. As with other summer sales companies, Alterra's life blood is its summer sales 
force; Alterra depends on them to sell and market its products. "Ninety-nine percent of 
all [Alterra's] customers come through the summer sales force." Id at 39:4-7. 
1 Alterra objects to Larson's statement of facts that contain legal conclusions, make 
factual statements not supported by the record, omit citations, and fail to properly cite to 
the record. None of Larson's factual statements contain proper citations to the record. 
The body of Larson's brief contains factual statements that are not supported by the 
record and not included in the statement of facts. Paragraphs 2, 4, and 6 of the statement 
of "facts" contain Larson's preferred interpretation of the contract, which are legal 
conclusions, not factual statements. Paragraphs 3, 8, 9, 10, and 11 contain factual 
conclusions that are disputed or not supported by the record. 
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3. The summer sales teams are made up of independent contractors, 2 the vast 
majority of whom are college students who sell door-to-door during their summer breaks. 
Id. at 42:5-11. 
4. Alterra sets up local offices in various cities depending on the number of 
people who join the summer sales team. Id. at 39:2-7, 41:7-12. 
5. Setting up a local office involves substantial overhead costs, including 
licensing costs, office costs, purchasing trucks, hiring operations management, hiring 
customer service teams, and hiring technicians. Id. at 39: 17-40: 15. 
6. When members of the sales team break their contracts, it can cause a 
substantial loss in terms of wasted overhead. Id. at 41:7-12. It also damages Alterra's 
reputation because it may force Alterra to break commitments in areas that it intended to 
have an office and hire staff. It hurts morale by creating fear that Alterra cannot be 
trusted or is not stable, which can cause more people to leave. Id. at 55:6-56:6. 
7. Sales representatives will generally work for three to six summers and Alterra 
must constantly recruit new representatives just to maintain the status quo. Alterra's 
reputation in the community and among those involved in the summer sales industry is 
critical to its success. Id. at 46:23-47:5; 194:22-195: 1. 
8. It is vital for Alterra's survival and growth to maintain good relationships with 
its sales representatives so that they will continue to work for Alterra, share positive 
2 Throughout this brief, Alterra will refer to members of its summer sales force 
interchangeably as "independent contractors," "contractors," "sales representatives," 
"representatives," "sales team," or "team members." 
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experiences with others, and enable Alterra to successfully recruit and retain new sales 
staff. Id. at 46:9-47:5. 
9. The possibility of other summer sales companies taking Alterra' s 
representatives and leaders is a significant threat to its survival and growth. Id. at 53: 1-
15, 53 :23-54:5. 
10. There are at least 48 summer sales companies who recruit college students for 
door-to-door sales. These summer sales companies compete for the best sales people and 
the competition is fierce. Some in the business world consider the summer sales industry 
to be the most fiercely-competitive industry. Id. at 41:21-42:1; 57:12-21. 
11. Alterra invests a lot of time and resources in identifying and assembling its 
sales team. Alterra's vetting process seeks to find representatives with past experience in 
leadership, sales, door-to-door soliciting, and who have a strong work ethic. Alterra 
requires a three-step interview process, personality test, background check, drug test, and 
extensive training. It keeps track of its potential recruits using its unique proprietary 
software. Id. at 43:6-13; 44:1-45:17; 46:16-47:5. 
12. Alterra turns down applicants that do not meet its rigorous criteria. Id. at 47:6-
10. 
13. Alterra is committed to investing in and training its summer sales force. It 
invests substantial time, money, and resources to improve its reputation and create the 
most elite sales force in the summer sales industry. It wants to create a positive 
reputation to ensure that members of the sales team have a fun and profitable experience, 
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return each summer during their college years, and share their positive experiences with 
others. Id. at 46:3-47:5. 
14. Alterra provides extensive training for those who pass the application process 
and join the sales team. Training for the summer sales season begins in January. From 
January through April there are one-hour training meetings every week. There are 
powerpoint presentations and password protected video broadcasts. Sales representatives 
can also come to Alterra's office at any time for additional training. Id. at 47:14-48:2. 
15. Once the team members arrive in their assigned locations, Alterra provides an 
additional three-week training course and daily training meetings. Alterra has a training 
manual and approximately forty training videos. Id. at 48 :6-49: 18 
16. Alterra's investment makes its sales representatives team much more 
successful than representatives at other summer sales companies. Representatives who 
previously worked for other summer sales companies sell 70% to 80% more after they 
begin working for Alterra and receive Alterra's training. Id. at 50:18-51:2. 
17. Retaining sales representatives is a top priority due to Alterra's substantial 
investment in training and its dependence on its sales force. Id. at 51 :9-22. R.000343, 
Deel. D. Royce~~ 11-13. 
· 18. Alterra protects its investment in sales representatives through confidentiality, 
non-solicitation, and non-disclosure agreements. R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg. Tr. at 51 :23-
52:2. One purpose of the non-solicitation agreement is to ensure a stable workforce. Id. 
104:20-25. Alterra encourages its managers, leaders, and representatives to keep team 
8 
members' identities confidential, not leave open their social media accounts and to set 
strong privacy settings. Id. at 52:4-1 0; 53: 1-6. 
19. Due to Alterra's significant investment in training and its reliance on its 
summer sales force, it is very damaging to Alterra when a representative breaks his or her 
agreement and tries to convince others to do the same, particularly when that person is a 
leader. Not only does Alterra lose its investment in finding, vetting, and training the 
person who leaves, but it creates uncertainty and instability among the sales staff that 
remain. If the person solicits others to leave, it creates more instability and Alterra may 
not be able to open as many offices, resulting in substantial wasted overhead. Id. at 55:3-
56:6, 163:3-25; 194:3-195:25. 
20. Alterra has a general compensation plan, but each representative has a specific 
plan that is negotiated on an individual basis. Representatives might be paid differently 
based on their skills or production. Specific compensation plans are kept confidential 
because it can cause frustration and loss of goodwill if representatives learn that a peer is 
getting paid more. Id. at 56:7-57: 11. Disclosure of this information is also harmful 
because it allows competing summer sales companies to know how much to offer to 
successfully steal Alterra's highly trained representatives. Id. at 53 :23-54:5 
21. Alterra and Larson entered into their first contract in 2012 with Larson as a 
team leader. They entered into subsequent contracts in 2013 and 2014. Id. at 58:8-15. 
22. During the summer of 2014, Larson's downline was 10% of Alterra's summer 
sales force. Id. at 127:24-128:6. 
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23. Larson was to be a regional manager for the 2015 summer selling season. Id. 
at 183:5-8. 
24. In August 2014, Larson executed an Agreement wherein he agreed to recruit 
and sell for Alterra for the 2015 summer sales season (the "2015 Agreement"). R.000004. 
25. Paragraph 13 of the 2015 Agreement provides: 
13) Non-Solicitation & Covenant Not to Compete 
Representative will not, during the term of this agreement, or for a period 
of 36 months from the date of termination of Representative's contractual 
relationship with Alterra, directly or indirectly, as a sole proprietor, 
member of a partnership or stockholder, investor, officer, or director of a 
corporation, or an employee, agent, associate or consultant of any person, 
firm or corporation, other than for the exclusive benefit of Altera: 
(i) Induce or attempt to induce, solicit or attempt to solicit, or 
encourage or attempt to encourage, in any capacity, on the Representative's 
own behalf or on behalf of any other firm, person, or entity, any then 
current customer of Alterra to terminate their contract with Alterra or to 
allow their contract to be cancelled, contract with another summer sales 
company. Representative understands that regardless of the industry, 
summer sales companies often recruit from the same talent pool. 
Representative acknowledges and agrees that the names, addresses, 
services, and information regarding Alterra Customers and Alterra 
Representatives and other service providers constitute Proprietary 
Information, and that the sale or unauthorized use or disclosure of this 
or any other Proprietary Information that Representative obtained during 
the course of this Agreement, and any former terms of employment with 
Alterra, would constitute unfair competition. Representative promises 
not to engage in any unfair competition with Alterra either during the 
term of this Agreement or at any time thereafter, and this includes 
knowingly or recklessly making statements about Alterra and its employees 
that are not true and/or that are based on speculation and insinuation. It is 
agreed that in the event that the Representative violates this non-
solicitation agreement, in addition to any other damages to which alterra 
may be entitled against Representative[,] Alterra will be entitled to 
monetary damages of the customer quarterly service fee rate multiplied by 
twenty-four, for each customer affected. 
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(ii) Recruit or attempt to recruit, directly or indirectly, in whole or in 
part, or assist others in recruiting or attempting to recruit, any former, 
current, or prospective employee or independent contractor 
(Representatives, Managers, Technicians, Office Staff, or any type of 
service providers) of Alterra for employment or contracts to provide 
services of the type offered by Alterra for any entity other than Alterra. 
It is the intent of the parties that this Non-Solicitation & Covenant not to 
Compete Agreement precludes Representatives from interfering in Alterra's 
business in any way. Representative further acknowledges that the backend 
compensation of this agreement constitutes valid and sufficient 
consideration for the duties and obligations set forth herein. 
R.000002-03 ( emphasis added). 
26. Paragraph 14 of the 2015 Agreement provides: 
14) Disclosure of Information 
Representative recognizes and acknowledges that Alterra's trade secrets and 
confidential proprietary information (such as but not limited to 
information relating to Alterra 's operations, the information contained in 
this Agreement, training of its Representatives and training materials, 
recruiting methods, services, vendors, products, database and access codes, 
customers, former customers, prospective customers, sales representatives, 
former sales representatives, and prospective sales representatives, Alterra 
employees, former Alterra employees, prospective Alterra employees, 
marketing, sales, financial, company sales numbers, and other business 
information data and plans, compensation plans, pricing agreements, future 
business development and strategic expansion initiatives, methods, processes, 
designs, performance tests, or reported problems with the services, and any 
other information identified in writing as confidential or information that 
Representatives knew or reasonably should have known was confidential), 
including such trade secrets or information as may exist from time to time, are 
valuable, special and unique assets of Alterra's business and access to and 
knowledge of which are essential to the performance of Rep's obligations to 
Alterra. All of this information is considered to be confidential and proprietary 
to Alterra. This proprietary information is not generally known in 
Alterra's industry and provides Alterra with an advantage over its 
competitors. Representative will not, during or after the term of his/her 
contractual relationship with Alterra, disclose such secrets or confidential 
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or proprietary information to any person, firm, corporation, association or 
other entity for any reason or purpose whatsoever, nor during such period shall 
representative make use of any such property for Representative's own 
purposes ... 
R.000002 ( emphasis added). 
27. After signing the 2015 Agreement, and during the fall of 2014, Larson received 
advances on the commissions that he was expected to earn during the summer of 2015. 
These advances included $7,000 a month and an additional $5,000 at his request. 
R.000316-17, 116-7; R.000813, Hrg. Tr. Feb. 11 at 60:5-61:3; 85:3-5; 184:14-20. 
28. Alterra also forwarded Larson $23,169.79 in bonuses based on his agreeing to 
recruit and perform his duties as a regional sales manager for Alterra during the 2015 
summer sales season. Alterra also gave Larson $957.34 in response to his requests for 
recruiting reimbursements. R.000316, Deel. V. Pearson, at 17. 
29. In December 2014 Larson executed an addendum to the 2015 Agreement (the 
"2014 Addendum"; the 2015 Agreement and 2014 Addendum are referred to collectively 
as the "Agreements"). The 2014 Addendum is used for regional sales managers. 
R.000813 at 79:12-14. 
30. Regional sales managers have access to more information than sales 
representatives or team leaders. Id. at 160:22-24; 188:24-189-13; 221:3-25. 
31. The 2014 Addendum, by its express terms, incorporates the terms of the 2015 
Agreement and provides additional protection to certain categories of Alterra 
information. R.000652, 2014 Addendum, Intro. 
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32. The 2014 Addendum contains a definition for "Confidential Information" that 
applies solely to the 2014 Addendum: 
As used in this Agreement, "Confidential Information" means any 
nonpublic information of a party, in oral, written, graphic or machine-
readable form, including without limitation that which relates to the Alterra 
Sales Guide, Alterra Training Materials and Guidelines, Alterra Welcome 
Letter, Alterra Sales Contract, Alterra Pricing Sheet, Alterra Compensation 
Models, research, product plans, products, inventions, processes, designs, 
algorithms, source code, programs, business plans, agreements with third 
parties, services, customers, marketing, finances or information gained by a 
party as a result of its discussions with the other party's personnel or 
business relationships, which is designated as confidential or proprietary by 
the disclosing party at the time of disclosure, or which considering all the 
circumstances surrounding the disclosure, ought reasonably to be 
understood by the receiving party to be confidential. 
Id. 1 1 ( emphasis added). 
33. The 2014 Addendum's definition of Confidential Information lists specific 
documents and types of information that were not specified in the 2015 Agreement's 
definition of "trade secrets and confidential proprietary information." Compare 
R.000652, 2014 Addendum at ,I 1 with R.000002, 2015 Agr. at ,I 14. 
34. The 2014 Addendum provides that Larson would not disclose the specified 
"Confidential Information" for a period of five years. R.000652 at 1 3. 
35. In late November or early December 2014, Alterra began hearing rumors that 
Larson was planning to leave Alterra, but Larson assured Alterra that he did not plan to 
leave. R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg. Tr. at 61:4-8; 63:3-9. 
36. As an Alterra regional sales manager, Larson had access to specific 
compensation information and private contact information for team leaders and sales 
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representatives in his downline, even if he had no contact with them. Id. at 188:24-189-
13, 221: 18-222: 18. 
3 7. Prior to leaving Alterra, Larson provided Vivint with private cell phone 
numbers for several of Alterra' s key leaders, managers, and other representatives. On 
January 7, 2015, these key leaders received a text message from a senior regional 
manager at Vivint asking them to meet about "coming over" to Vivint. Id. at 210:4-
212:5; 263:16-23; 296:9-22. 
38. Two of these key leaders, Ray Gonzalez and Jacob Bennington, received this 
text message at nearly the same time and were with Larson when they received it. When 
they wondered how a "random guy" and senior regional manager at Vivint got their 
private cell phone numbers, Larson acted as ifhe did not know. Id. at 212:18-213:1; 
R.000322, Deel. R. Gonzalez, ,r,r 6-9. 
3 9. Gonzalez and Bennington later learned from Larson that Larson himself gave 
their private cell phone numbers to Vivint. R.000813 at 213 :20-24; 265: 18-20; 
R.000328, Deel. J. Bennington, ,r 11. 
40. Gonzalez and Bennington met with Vivint and Larson on January 12 and 
January 17, when Larson was still under contract with Alterra. R.000813 at 213:7-
215:12; 265:13-266:8. Larson's meeting with Bennington occurred at Alterra's offices. 
Id. at 214: 14-17. 
41. Larson solicited Gonzalez at various other times as well, usually via phone 
calls. Id. at 269:22-270: 18. 
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42. Larson explained to Gonzalez and Bennington that he was soliciting "key 
guys" to break their contracts with Alterra to work for Vivint instead. He stated that he 
had already spoken with some leaders and had plans to contact others. Id. at 217:22-
~ 218:12; 266:24-267:17. 
43. After soliciting key leaders and managers, Larson began soliciting other sales 
team members as well. Id. at 146:7-9. 
44. As part of his efforts to disrupt Alterra's work force and convince key players 
to break their Alterra contracts, Larson disclosed specific compensation plans for several 
Alterra representatives and leaders. Id. at 219: 11-220:9; 220:24-221 :21. 
45. As a result of the solicitation and disclosures, Gonzalez and Bennington broke 
their contracts with Alterra and signed contracts with Vivint. Alterra was able to change 
their minds only by offering increased compensation. Id. at 223 :5-7, 223 :22-24, 279:8-
24; R.000328, Deel. J. Bennington, il 16. 
46. On January 22, 2015, Larson texted Alterra team leader Joshua Zuniga and 
requested a meeting to discuss terminating Zuniga's contract with Alterra. When Zuniga 
declined the request, Larson offered to pay him $200 just for the chance to meet. 
R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg. Tr. at 285:4-14; R.000288, text message; R.000293, Deel. J. 
Zuniga, at ilil 5-6. 
47. Vivint's senior regional manager also contacted people in Zuniga's downline 
using cell phone numbers that are not publicly available. R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg Tr. at 
286:5-287:5. 
15 
48. Many of Alterra's other sales representatives have reported being contacted by 
Larson and Vivint' s senior regional manager. Id. at 64: 19-22; 65 :8-11. 
49. Larson formally broke his contract with Alterra on or about January 23, 2015 
at a meeting with Alterra's CEO and an attorney for Vivint. Id. at 64:13-18. 
50. Larson's solicitation of Alterra's representatives has hurt morale and Alterra 
has had to renegotiate many contracts as a result of Larson's conduct. Id. at 67:5-18; 
R.000315-16, Deel. V. Pearson, at ,r,r 11-12. 
51. Larson's conduct also has created uncertainty and instability. It has required 
Alterra to expend time and resources to fix the damage and re-recruit those who have 
been solicited by Larson. It is impossible to quantify the harmful effects on morale and 
stability. R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg. Tr. at 163:9-164:7; 194:3-195:25. 
52. Larson testified that he is an "incredible," talented recruiter and salesman and 
can recruit for Vivint without soliciting Alterra's leaders and representatives. Id. at 
329:17-18; 349:15-23. 
53. Alterra filed its complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction on January 
23, 2015 alleging breach of contract, trade secret violations, and intentional interference 
with contract. The district court held a hearing on January 30, 2015 and orally granted a 
temporary restraining order ("TRO") prohibiting Larson from further soliciting Alterra' s 
representatives. 
54. That evening, Larson assisted at a recruiting event for Vivint with Alterra 
representatives in attendance. Larson initially testified that Alterra representatives were 
not present, and then testified that they were present. Id. at 326:9-18; 331: 18-334:21. 
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5 5. The district court held a two-day hearing on February 11-12 and heard 
evidence on Alterra's motion for a preliminary injunction. R.000813-14. 
56. After reviewing the evidence, the district court orally granted a limited 
i.40 preliminary injunction enjoining Larson from soliciting current Alterra sales 
representatives, disclosing private phone numbers obtained through Alterra, and 
disclosing representatives' specific compensation plans. R.000814, 157-70; R000580, 
Preliminary Injunction Order ("Order"). 
57. The district court found that Alterra had shown that it was substantially likely 
to prevail on the merits or that the case presented serious issues on the merits which 
should be the subject of further litigation. R.000578, Order at 113. 
58. The court concluded that the 2015 Agreement prohibited soliciting Alterra's 
sales representatives and disclosing contact information and specific compensation 
information. ld.117-9-10, 12, 13-15, 17. 
59. The court found that Larson repeatedly had solicited some of Alterra's "key 
sales people" and disclosed their personal cell phone numbers to Vivint, a finding that 
v;J Larson does not dispute. Id. 11 15-17, 20, 22-23, 25-31. 
60. The court also determined that Larson's efforts to recruit Alterra' s key 
representatives to work for Vivint included the improper disclosure of information related 
(@ 
to the specific compensation plans for some of Alterra sales representatives. Id. 11 3, 7, 
12. 
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61. The court found that this conduct irreparably harmed Alterra, that the equities 
balanced in favor of Alterra, and that an injunction was not against public policy. Id. 
1115, 18-23, 25, 27-31, 35-37. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The appeal should be dismissed for failure to marshal the evidence. To challenge 
a district court's factual findings or conclusions that are based on the facts, an appellant 
must summarize or "marshal," all the evidence that supports the district court's findings. 
Larson's brief challenges the district court's factual findings or fact-based conclusions 
without marshaling the evidence that supports the district court's decision. This is 
procedurally deficient and the appeal should be dismissed. 
A reviewing court will not disturb the grant of a preliminary injunction unless the 
district court abused its discretion and issued a decision against the weight of the 
evidence. A preliminary injunction is justified when the applicant shows a likelihood of 
success or serious issues on the merits, a threat of irreparable harm, that the injury to the 
applicant absent an injunction outweighs injury to the enjoined party, and that the 
injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. 3 The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in granting a limited preliminary injunction with minimal restrictions. The 
injunction balances the parties' interests by allowing Larson to pursue his chosen 
occupation while only requiring that he (1) not solicit persons who are currently under 
3 Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e). The Rules list these requirements in a different order; they are 
listed here in the order they are addressed in Larson's brief. 
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contract with Alterra and (2) not disclose contact information or specific compensation 
plans. 
Alterra demonstrated that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its breach of 
contract and trade secret claims or that there were serious issues on the merits. The 2015 
Agreement prohibits Larson from soliciting Alterra representatives or making 
unauthorized use of information he obtained through his work at Alterra, such as names, 
contact information, and specific compensation information for Alterra representatives. 
Larson asserts that the agreement was modified, but does not support this assertion with 
case law or reasoned analysis and the Court need not consider it. Even if Larson did not 
waive this argument, the 2014 Addendum incorporates the terms of the 2015 Agreement, 
their terms do not conflict, and Larson is bound by both. 
The non-solicitation and non-disclosure provisions are enforceable and the district 
court's limited injunction was not an abuse of discretion. Courts throughout the country 
recognize that businesses have an interest in the stability of their workforce and can 
protect that interest by prohibiting former employees from recruiting away current 
employees. Non-disclosure and non-solicitation provisions are fundamentally different 
from covenants that prohibit an employee from pursing his or her trade. The district 
court's preliminary injunction did not prohibit Larson from recruiting among the 
thousands of college students in the summer sales talent pool. It merely required that he 
refrain from soliciting current members of Alterra's sales force and disclosing their 
contact and specific compensation information. Larson has not marshaled the evidence 
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and does not dispute the district court's factual finding that the injunction imposes a very 
minimal restriction. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Alterra was likely 
to succeed on its trade secret claim or demonstrated serious issues on the merits which 
should be the subject of further litigation. Whether particular information is a "trade 
secret" under the Uniform Trade Secret Act ("UTSA") is a question of fact, or at least a 
fact-intensive inquiry, and Larson has not marshaled the evidence. Alterra presented 
substantial evidence as to the importance and value of representatives' contact and 
specific compensation information, Alterra's efforts to assemble it, and Alterra's 
reasonable efforts to protect it. In addition, the 2015 Agreement defined the information 
as "trade secrets and confidential proprietary information." 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Alterra demonstrated 
irreparable harm. Irreparable harm includes threatened harm and wrongs of a repeated 
and continuing nature. Trade secrets are property rights that carry a presumption of 
irreparable harm for purposes of injunctive relief. Larson waived his irreparable harm 
argument by failing to marshal the evidence relied upon by the district court. Alterra 
presented evidence that Larson had a plan to steal its key leaders and managers, shared 
private cell phone numbers with a competing summer sales company, repeatedly solicited 
Alterra representatives, and successfully recruited two key leaders to join a competing 
summer sales company until Alterra convinced them to return by increasing their 
compensation. The district court heard evidence of the disruption, instability, and harm 
to morale caused by Larson's conduct, and that it would be impossible to quantify these 
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harms. Larson presented no evidence to the contrary. The court also learned that Larson 
assisted in a Vivint recruiting event for Alterra representatives and others right after the 
court issued its TRO requiring Larson to refrain from recruiting Alterra representatives. 
The district court correctly concluded that the harms to Alterra outweigh any harm 
to Larson that might result from the limited preliminary injunction. Alterra presented 
substantial evidence of the harm it had suffered and would continue to suffer if Larson 
were to continue his course of conduct. Larson presented no evidence of any harm the 
injunction might impose on him. He does not dispute the district court's factual finding 
that the injunction's impact is minimal and leaves him with a large talent pool from 
which he can recruit for other summer sales companies. The injunction does not prevent 
him from knocking on doors, visiting college campuses, contacting family and neighbors, 
or contacting friends who are not currently under contract with Alterra. It only requires 
that he refrain from recruiting Alterra's current sales team and disclosing Alterra 
representatives' contact information and specific compensation information. Larson 
himself testified that he can be successful without poaching from Alterra's sales force. 
The injunction is only a minor restriction. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that an injunction was 
not adverse to the public. Larson waived any argument to the contrary by failing to 
support his objection with reasoned analysis. Utah has a preference for enforcing 
contracts. Courts around the country recognize that non-solicitation and non-disclosure 
provisions do not threaten to restrain competition in the same manner as covenants not to 
compete. The district court's limited injunction does not impinge on Larson's ability to 
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THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DIMSISSED FOR LARSON'S FAILURE TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
It is well settled that an appellant challenging a district court's interpretation of the 
facts "'must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate 
that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a 
light most favorable to the court below."' Or/ob v. Wasatch Med. Mgmt., 2005 UT App 
430, ,I 26, 124 P.3d 269 (quoting Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,,I25, 112 P.3d 495). It 
is not sufficient for a party to merely reargue its interpretation of facts that could be 
viewed in its favor. "An appellant 'must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists.'" Parduhn, 2005 UT 22 at ,r 25 ( quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 
82, ,I 77, 100 P .3d 1177). This rule applies whether the party is challenging an ultimate 
finding or subsidiary finding that leads to an ultimate conclusion. Id. 
In the present appeal, many of Larson's complaints about the district court's 
decision are, at their core, challenges to the court's factual conclusions, either because the 
issue is a purely factual question or because it relies heavily on the court's interpretation 
of the facts. For example, Larson argues that certain information cannot be a trade secret 
without marshaling the evidence that supports the district court's conclusion; he disputes 
the district court's finding as to irreparable harm without showing how the facts are 
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legally insufficient; he complains about the district court's balancing of the harms 
without listing the underlying facts that supported the district court's findings. It is not 
the appellate court's job to comb through the record and determine whether the disputed 
~ findings lack evidentiary support. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233 at il 20 n.5. Larson has 
not met his burden, and the appeal should be dismissed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT ALTERRA 
WAS ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 
An order granting a preliminary injunction is not easily set aside. The party 
challenging the injunction must show that the district '" court abused its discretion or 
rendered a decision clearly against the weight of the evidence."' Zagg, 2015 UT App 52, 
at, 4 (quotation omitted); see also Aquagen Int'!, Inc., 972 P.2d at 412-13 ("When 
reviewing a trial court's grant of an injunction, we are generally careful not to disturb the 
ruling unless the court abused its discretion."). 
A party is entitled to an injunction by showing four elements: ( 1) "substantial 
likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case 
presents serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation"; (2) 
"[t]he applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues"; (3) 
"[t]he threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order 
or injunction may cause to the party restrained or enjoined"; and (4) "[t]he order or 
injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65A(e). 
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Here, the district court's order was the result of reviewing extensive briefing and 
listening to evidence over the course of a two-day hearing. The evidence supported the 
district court's conclusion and there was no abuse of discretion. 
A. The District Court Correctly Concluded that Alterra Made the 
Necessary Preliminary Injunction Showing on the Likelihood Prong. 
Larson does not dispute that he was engaged in (1) soliciting Alterra's 
representatives and encouraging them to break their contracts with Alterra, and (2) using, 
discussing, and disclosing contact and specific compensation information that he was 
contractually obligated not to disclose. His argument that Alterra's claims cannot 
succeed is based on his assertion that the Agreements did not prohibit his conduct and if 
they did, the contracts are not enforceable. Larson is incorrect under both theories. The 
2015 Agreement specifically prohibits Larson from soliciting Alterra representatives and 
making unauthorized use of or disclosing Alterra information. Non-solicitation and non-
disclosure provisions are enforceable. At the very least, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that the case presents serious issues on the merits which should 
be the subject of further litigation. 
1. The contract prohibits Mr. Larson from soliciting, or assisting 
others in soliciting, Alterra 's independent contractors. 
The district court correctly concluded that the Agreements prohibit Mr. Larson 
from soliciting, or assisting others to solicit, Alterra's sales representatives and 
attempting to recruit them to work for other summer sales companies. 
In interpreting contracts, it is well-settled that all provisions must be read '"in 
relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none."' 
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E&H Land, Ltd. v. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 237, ~ 13, 336 P.3d 1077 (quoting 
WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, ~ 18, 54 P.3d 1139). Each 
portion of the agreement must be read in connection with all others. Minshew v. Chevron 
~ Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978) (holding that a portion of one paragraph must be 
read in connection with all other provisions of a sublease). Provisions which may seem 
ambiguous can become clear when "considered in the context of the entire document." 
Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982). 
In the present case, Paragraph 13 prohibits Larson from the unauthorized use of 
Alterra information, including disclosing information about Alterra representatives and 
specific compensation plans, and the solicitation of Alterra representatives to work for 
other summer sales companies. 
Paragraph 13 of the 2015 Agreement reads as follows: 
13) Non-Solicitation & Covenant Not to Compete 
Representative will not, during the term of this agreement, or for a period 
of 36 months from the date of termination of Representative's contractual 
relationship with Alterra, directly or indirectly, as a sole proprietor, 
member of a partnership or stockholder, investor, officer, or director of a 
corporation, or an employee, agent, associate or consultant of any person, 
firm or corporation, other than for the exclusive benefit of Altera: 
(i) Induce or attempt to induce, solicit or attempt to solicit, or 
encourage or attempt to encourage, in any capacity, on the Representative's 
own behalf or on behalf of any other firm, person, or entity, any then 
current customer of Alterra to terminate their contract with Alterra or to 
allow their contract to be cancelled, contract with another summer sales 
company. Representative understands that regardless of the industry, 
summer sales companies often recruit from the same talent pool. 
Representative acknowledges and agrees that the names, addresses, 
services, and information regarding Alterra Customers and Alterra 
Representatives and other service providers constitute Proprietary 
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Information, and that the sale or unauthorized use or disclosure of this 
or any other Proprietary Information that Representative obtained during 
the course of this Agreement, and any former terms of employment with 
Alterra, would constitute unfair competition Representative promises 
not to engage in any unfair competition with Alterra either during the 
term of this Agreement or at any time thereafter, and this includes 
knowingly or recklessly making statements about Alterra and its employees 
that are not true and/or that are based on speculation and insinuation. It is 
agreed that in the event that the Representative violates this non-
solicitation agreement, in addition to any other damages to which alterra 
may be entitled against Representative[,] Alterra will be entitled to 
monetary damages of the customer quarterly service fee rate multiplied by 
twenty-four, for each customer affected. 
(ii) Recruit or attempt to recruit, directly or indirectly, in whole or in 
part, or assist others in recruiting or attempting to recruit, any former, 
current, or prospective employee or independent contractor 
(Representatives, Managers, Technicians, Office Staff, or any type of 
service providers) of Alterra for employment or contracts to provide 
services of the type offered by Alterra for any entity other than Alterra. 
It is the intent of the parties that this Non-Solicitation & Covenant not to 
Compete Agreement precludes Representatives from interfering in Alterra's 
business in any way. Representative further acknowledges that the backend 
compensation of this agreement constitutes valid and sufficient 
consideration for the duties and obligations set forth herein. 
R.000002-03 ( emphasis added). In executing the 2015 Agreement, Larson agreed that he 
would not disclose or use information about Alterra representatives, such as their 
identity, contact information, and specific compensation plans, or solicit them to work for 
other companies in the competitive summer sales industry. 
The district court read all of paragraph 13 and concluded that the non-solicitation 
and unauthorized use provisions "prevent[] Defendant from soliciting Plaintiffs 
employees or independent contractors." R.000578-79, Order at 112, 10. The court noted 
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that the parties contemplated the competitive nature of summer sales companies, that all 
recruit from the same talent pool, and that the parties intended that Larson refrain from 
interfering with Alterra's business. When read in harmony, these terms prohibit Larson 
from soliciting Alterra's representatives to break their contracts with Alterra to work for 
other summer sales companies. Id.~~ 9-10.4 Even if there is some ambiguity, Alterra 
has shown that there are serious issues on the merits that require further litigation. 
The district court's conclusion was correct. Subparagraph 13(i) notes the 
competitive nature of summer sales companies who compete for the most talented sales 
representatives and prohibits the "unauthorized use or disclosure" of information 
regarding Alterra sales representatives. It is undisputed that Larson's use and disclosure 
of the names, contact information, and specific compensation information of Alterra sales 
representatives, including those he described as "key guys," was not authorized by 
Alterra. Subparagraph 13(ii), when read in harmony with the rest of Paragraph 13, 
emphasizes the competitive nature of the summer sales industry and the intent of the 
parties that Larson not interfere in Alterra's business, making clear that the services and 
industry in the 2015 Agreement is the competitive door-to-door services of the summer 
sales industry.5 
4 Alterra' s CEO and some sales representatives testified as to the purpose and meaning 
of Paragraph 13, but the district court's conclusion relied solely on the plain terms of 
Paragraph 13 without making any reference to witness testimony. 
5 Larson's assertion that Alterra cannot succeed because its complaint did not cite a 
specific subsection of Paragraph 13 illustrates the absence of real argument in his favor. 
Utah is a notice-pleading state; a party can succeed on a breach of contract claim by 
simply alleging a summary of contractual terms and need not point to each and every 
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Although the district court did not rely on witness testimony to interpret the 2015 
Agreement, there was evidence that the services or industry mentioned is the summer 
sales industry. Feb. 11 Hrg. Tr. at 281 :23-283: 13 (testimony of Ray Gonzalez testifying 
that Vivint and Alterra work in the same summer sales industry and the Agreement 
prohibits recruiting Alterra's representatives to other summer sales companies); id. at 
291:12-18 (testimony of Joshua Zuniga); id at 308:23-25 (testimony of Daniel Naseath); 
Feb. 12 Hrg. Tr. at 79: 1-3 (Larson testimony that he became involved in "[t]he industry 
of door-to-door sales"). Thus, if there is ambiguity, the evidence supports the district 
court's conclusion that the contract prohibits Larson from recruiting Alterra sales 
representatives to other summer sales companies. At the very least, there are serious 
issues on the merits and the district court did not abuse its discretion. 
2. Regardless of the industry, and even under the 2014 Addendum, 
the Agreements prohibit Larson from disclosing contact 
information and specific compensation plans. 
The 2015 Agreement prohibits Larson from disclosing "trade secrets and 
confidential proprietary information," which is defined to include information relating to 
past, present, and prospective Alterra sales representatives and employees, training 
materials, and compensation plans. R.000002, 2015 Agr. at ,I 14; R.000578-79, Order at 
113, 7, 12. By signing the Agreement, Larson acknowledged that this information "is 
specific subsection that was allegedly breached. The district court and parties carefully 
examined Paragraph 13, including all its subsections, during the two-day hearing. Larson 
presented his interpretation of each subsection and was not caught off-guard by the 
court's reliance on all of Paragraph 13. See, e.g., R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg. Tr. at 203:13- .~ 
204: 16; 229:25-230: 13 (counsel for Larson questioning a witness about Paragraph 13(i)); 
Id. at 139:2-10 (counsel for Larson referencing Paragraph 13(i) during closing argument). 
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not generally known and gives Alterra a business advantage." R.000002, 2015 Agr. at 
,I 14. Larson asserts that the 2015 Agreement was modified to remove those restrictions 
and his disclosure of this information was not prohibited. Appellant Br. at 22-24. This 
¼JP assertion is without merit for two reasons. First, the assertion is inadequately briefed as 
Larson does not support it with legal citations and analysis. Accordingly, it_ is waived. 
Second, even if the issue was adequately briefed and the facts properly marshaled, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the 2014 Addendum 
incorporated and did not supersede the 2015 Agreement. 
i. Larson waived his modification assertion by failing to 
adequately brief it. 
Larson has waived any argument related to modification of the 2015 Agreement 
\ 
by failing to support his bare allegations with case law or legal analysis relevant to 
determining whether an agreement has been modified or superseded. See Spafford v. 
1v:iP Granite Credit Union, 2011 UT App 401, ,I,I 24-25, 266 P. 3d 866 (refusing to consider 
an inadequately briefed argument when the party recited the law but did not apply the law 
to the facts at issue); Seamons v. Brandley, 2011 UT App 434, ,I 5, 268 P. 3d 195 
(refusing to consider an issue because the party did not present a reasoned analysis based 
on authority); Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98 ,I 7, 17 P. 3d 1122 ("It is 
t.tJi) well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately 
briefed."). 
Larson makes a vague reference to "well-settled rules of contract interpretation," 
but he does not mention which of the many "well-settled rules" he wishes to invoke, 
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includes no law outlining how these unspecified principles apply, lists no facts, provides 
no contractual provision that was supposedly modified or superseded, and provides no 
analysis of how or why the unspecified legal principles and contractual provisions 
support his assertion that the 2014 Addendum removed all restrictions on disclosing 
information for sales representatives and specific compensation. He asserts that the 2015 
Agreement and 2014 Addendum contain conflicting definitions for the same terms, but 
provides no excerpt or record citation for the supposedly conflicting terms. 
Footnote 8 of Larson's brief cites a few cases for the unremarkable principle that 
parties to a contract may modify their agreement, but he does not explain or argue how a 
court determines whether a particular provision has been superseded and why it has been 
superseded in the present case. Further, the cases cited offer no insight for how the Court 
should view the situation in the present case. 6 
Larson has not briefed this issue and the Court should not consider it. If Larson 
decides to make a legal argument on this point in his reply brief, Alterra should be given 
the opportunity to respond. 
6 Harris v. JES Associates, Inc. 2003 UT App 112,, 46, 69 P.3d 297, is not on point 
because the issue was whether an unsigned bid proposal was a contract. In Rapp v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph, 606 P.2d 1189, 1192 (Utah 1980), the issue 
was breach, not modification. Ward v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2007 UT App 362,, 8, 
173 P.3d 186, is potentially relevant, but Larson fails to analyze it or apply it to the 
present case. 
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ii. The order's reference to the 2014 agreement is a scrivener's 
error. 
Larson accuses the district court of completely ignoring the 2014 Addendum, but a 
review of the transcript shows that the alleged error was a simple misstatement at the end 
of an intense two-day hearing. The district court misspoke when giving his oral ruling; 
this is essentially a scrivener's error, which can be corrected, and is not an abuse of 
~ discretion. 
It is undisputed that the plain terms of the 2014 Addendum incorporate the 2015 
Agreement. During the hearing, the district court fully considered Larson's argument 
that, despite the incorporation language, the 2014 Addendum supposedly superseded the 
disclosure restrictions contained in the 2015 Agreement. R.000814, Feb 12 Hrg. Tr. at 
133:21-25, 137:10-138:9. In its oral ruling rejecting Larson's argument, the district court 
correctly referred to the December 2014 Addendum as an addendum to the 2015 
Agreement. It then noted that the 2014 Addendum, by "its express terms incorporates the 
terms of the 2014 agreement," mistakenly saying "2014" rather than "2015." This is an 
easy mistake because the 2015 Agreement was, in fact, executed in 2014, several months 
before the 2014 Addendum. In light of the court's previous reference to the 2015 
Agreement, this later reference to the 2014 Agreement is a simple mistake. The excerpt 
from the hearing transcript makes this clear: 
There was also an addendum to the 2014 --2015 agreement, but it -- it -- it 
actually doesn't supercede, but rather, by its express terms, incorporates the 
terms of the 2014 agreement." 
Id. at 157:17-20. 
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As Larson acknowledges, the express terms of the 2014 Addendum incorporate 
the 2015 Agreement. Appellant Br. at 23. The district court correctly identified the 2015 
Agreement in the first part of the sentence. The incorrect reference to the 2014 
Agreement does not mean that the court failed to consider whether the 2014 Addendum 
incorporated or superseded certain terms of the 2015 Agreement. 
iii. The December 2014 Addendum incorporated and did not 
supersede the 2015 Agreement. 
Even if Larson had not waived his modification argument, it is clear that the 2014 
Addendum did not supersede the 2015 Agreement. 
Whether a contractual provision has been superseded "depends upon the intent of 
the parties." Ringwoodv. Foreign Auto Works, 671 P.2d 182,183 (Utah 1983), 
overruled on other grounds by Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ,r 17 n.20, 
182 P .3 d 3 26. In examining whether provisions of one contract supersede provisions of a 
prior contract, the Court "attempt[s] to harmonize all of the contract's provisions and all 
of its terms." Cent. Fla. lnvs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ,r,r 12, 14, 40 P.3d 
599 ( determining that dispute resolution provisions in an addendum could not be 
harmonized with similar provisions in the original contract because one required 
arbitration and the other required mediation). "' [O]ne contract will not supersede another 
unless it is plainly shown that [such] was the intent of the parties ... where the later 
contract fully covers [the] earlier one."' Ward v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2007 UT App 
3 62, ,r 8, 173 P .3 d 186 ( quoting Hor man v. Gordon, 7 40 P .2d 1346, 13 51 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987)) (emphasis added). 
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In the present case, the terms of the 2014 Addendum fully incorporate, and thus do 
not replace, the non-disclosure provisions of the 2015 Agreement. The parties' intent is 
clear from the terms of the 2014 Addendum: "the Representative's Direct Seller 
Agreement, which is incorporated herein by this reference." R.000652, 2014 
Addendum at 1, Intro. ( emphasis added). Because intent is clear, the Court can end its 
inquiry here. Tangren Family Trust, 2008 UT 20, at, 17 ( overruling prior cases where 
courts examined extrinsic evidence to determine intent). 
Even if the 2014 Addendum had not explicitly incorporated the 2015 Agreement, 
it did not supersede it because that was not the intent of the parties and the terms can be 
harmonized. The 2014 Addendum defines a new term, "Confidential Information," that 
is not defined in the 2015 Agreement. The 2015 Agreement defines "trade secret and 
confidential proprietary information," a term that is not defined in the 2014 Addendum 
and which lists information different from the 2014 Addendum's definition of 
"Confidential Information." Perhaps more importantly, the 2014 Addendum's definition 
of "Confidential Information" is limited to the 2014 Addendum and does not apply to the 
~ 2015 Agreement. The 2014 Addendum defines itself as the "Agreement" and provides: 
"As used in this Agreement, 'Confidential Information' means ... " R.000652, 2014 
Addendum at ,I 1 (emphasis added). 
In addition, the 2015 Agreement and 2014 Addendum protect different 
information. The 2014 Addendum is used for regional sales managers who have access 
to more information than regular sales representatives. SoF ,r, 28-29, supra. The 2015 
Agreement lists general categories related to the type of information that a beginning 
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sales representative may have access to, but the 2014 Addendum lists specific documents 
by name and focuses on higher-level information such as source code, business plans, 
and negotiations with third parties. Further, the 2014 Addendum's non-disclosure 
provision applies for five years. The 2015 Agreement, on the other hand, does not 
contain a time limit. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the 2014 
Addendum did not supersede the 2015 Agreement. 
iv. Even if the 2014 Addendum superseded the 2015 Agreement, it 
still prohibited Larson from disclosing non-public phone 
numbers and specific compensation plans. 
Under the 2015 Agreement, Larson's obligation to not disclose private contact 
information and specific compensation information survives the termination of the 2015 
Agreement. Thus, even if the 2014 Addendum terminated, rather than incorporated, the 
2015 Agreement, Larson is not free to disclose protected information. 
In addition, the 2014 Addendum prohibits Larson from disclosing "nonpublic 
information," including "agreements with third parties." R.000652, 2014 Addendum at 
~~ 1-2. It also prohibits him from discussing or sharing the contents or terms of the 
compensation received by Larson or other sales representatives. Id. ~ 3. As a contractor 
for Alterra, Larson had access to nonpublic phone numbers and compensation plans for 
various Alterra representatives. He obtained this information only through his 
employment with Alterra and is bound to keep this information confidential. 
Larson claims that he has no duty to keep this nonpublic information confidential 
because at the time he signed the 2014 Addendum, Alterra already had shared the 
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information with him in the course of his earlier work at Alterra and pursuant to the 
Agreements previously signed. This assertion cannot be taken seriously. Larson 
received this information during the course of his work with Alterra and he was 
continuously bound to keep it confidential. The fact that Larson already had received 
some protected information that he was duty-bound not to disclose when he renewed his 
duty does not convert that information to the public domain. 
Even if the 2014 Addendum superseded the 2015 Agreement, an assertion that 
Alterra vigorously disputes, it still prohibited Larson from disclosing nonpublic contact 
information and specific compensation information for Alterra representatives. 
3. The non-solicitation and non-disclosure provisions are 
enforceable and the district court's limited injunction was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
The non-disclosure and non-solicitation provisions do not restrict Larson's 
employment and need not be analyzed under the framework that applies to non-compete 
agreements. Even if that framework did apply, however, Larson has not shown that the 
district court abused its discretion. 
A restrictive employment covenant is enforceable if it: ( 1) is supported by 
consideration; (2) was not negotiated in bad faith; (3) is necessary to protect the goodwill 
of the business; and (4) is reasonable in time and area. See System Concepts, Inc. v. 
Dixon, 669 P .2d 421, 425-26 (Utah 1983 ). Larson does not argue lack of consideration 
or bad faith. Rather, he claims that Alterra has no protectable interest in its relationship 
with its workforce and that the injunction was unreasonable. Both assertions are 
incorrect. 
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i. Non-solicitation and non-disclosure provisions are enforceable to 
protect a legitimate interest in a stable workforce. 
It is well-settled that covenants not to disclose and not to solicit employees from a 
former employer are enforceable. Courts around the country, including Utah courts, 
recognize that maintaining a stable workforce is a protectable business interest and that a 
covenant not to solicit a company's workforce is fundamentally different from provisions 
that prohibit a fonner employee from working for a competitor. These courts have 
enforced restrictions on soliciting employees and independent contractors in a variety of 
situations. See, e.g., Neways Inc. v. Mower, 543 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1287-88 (D. Utah 
2008) ( enforcing a non-solicitation provision that prohibited soliciting current 
independent contractors)/ Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Robinson, 12 F.3d 
515,519 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a covenant not to recruit the plaintiffs employees 
did not fall within a state statute prohibiting restraint of trade because defendant was free 
to pursue his trade, he was merely prohibited from soliciting plaintiffs employees); 
Totino v. Alexander & Assocs., 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 5295, at *32-33 (Tex. App. 
Houston 1st Dist. 1998) (enforcing a covenant not to solicit employees; "We consider 
nonrecruitment covenants to be, by analogy, more like nondisclosure covenants than 
noncompetition covenants"); Oxford Global Res., Inc. v. Consolo, 2002 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 559, at *14 (Supp. Ct. Mass. 2002) (enforcing a covenant not to solicit employees 
and contractors because an employer's "good will ( and business success) is tied closely 
7 The non-solicitation provision in Neways Inc. v. Mower, 543 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1287-88 
(D. Utah 2008), did not prohibit the defendants from soliciting distributors in their 
frontlines, but the Court did not hold that this fact was determinative. 
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to the work and contacts of its recruiters like [ defendant], and that therefore it is entitled 
to protect those contacts through use of an employment agreement that precludes 
solicitation of [ employer's] contractors"); Integrated Genomics, Inc. v. Kyrpides, 2010 
~ U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6156, at *29-31 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2010) (holding that a non-
solicitation provision is enforceable because employers have a protectable interest in a 
stable workforce and the provision does not significantly restrain trade). 8 
In the present case, the 2015 Agreement prohibits Larson from soliciting Alterra's 
representatives and the unauthorized use or sharing of information about Alterra's 
representatives, such as names, positions, contact information, and specific compensation 
plans. These provisions are enforceable and are not a restraint on trade. Larson testified 
that he is "an incredible recruiter" and was able to recruit sales representatives for Vivint 
without soliciting those under contract with Alterra. 9 After reviewing all the evidence, 
the district court found that enjoining Larson from soliciting Alterra's current sales 
representatives was a minor restriction that would not have a significant impact on his 
ability to recruit others. R.000574-75, 578, Order at 11 15, 36-38. Although the district 
8 See also John Jay Esthetic Salon, Inc. v. Woods, 377 So. 2d 1363, 1366 (La. App. Ct. 
1979) ( enforcing a covenant not to solicit employees because "[ a ]n agreement not to 
engage in competition with the employer is vastly different from an agreement not to 
solicit the employer's customers or employees or to engage in a business relationship 
with the employees or contractors"); Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 174 Cal. App. 3d 268, 278-79 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1985) (enjoining defendant from soliciting employees because it was no 
more a restraint of trade than prohibiting disclosure of confidential information); Nova 
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Eng'g Consulting Servs., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46925, at *71 
(W.D. Tex. June 3, 2005) (holding that "covenants not to solicit [plaintiffs] employees 
do not bar competition and are not restraints on trade or commerce"). 
9 R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg Tr. at 329:17-18; 349:11-23. 
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court did not include numerous case citations in its oral ruling, the parties' briefs cited 
several of the above cases which informed the district court's conclusion that non-
solicitation and non-disclosure provisions are different from non-compete provisions, and 
that Alterra had a protectable interest in the stability of its workforce and maintaining 
good relationships with its sales representatives. 
There is no basis for Larson's conclusion that paragraph 13 is not enforceable or 
that "subparagraph 13(i) is a non-compete provision." Appellant's Br. at 25. First, there 
is nothing in subparagraph 13(i) stating that it is a non-compete provision. Paragraph 
13 's heading is "Non-Solicitation & Covenant Not to Compete," but there is nothing that 
identifies subparagraph 13(i) as a non-compete provision. Paragraph 25 of the 2015 
Agreement provides that headings are for convenience and not to be used in interpreting 
the Agreement. Finally, the relevant terms of subparagraph 13(i) do not prohibit Larson 
from competing with Alterra; rather, they prohibit solicitation and unauthorized use of 
information. 
Larson's citation to Cordell v. Berger, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20049, at* 13 (D. 
Utah Nov. 27, 2001), is unhelpful. Cordell was a pure trade secret case; there was no 
employment contract for the court to examine. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 
(Utah 1982), is also distinguishable as the case did not involve solicitation of employees 
or a non-disclosure agreement. The hearing aid salesman was not privy to any 
confidential information, there was no evidence that he could impact his former 
employer's goodwill or other protectable interests, the employer had not invested much 
to train him, and the employer sought to keep him from selling hearing aids. Id. at 627-
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28. The present case, in contrast, involves an agreement not to solicit or disclose certain 
information and a regional sales manager, Larson, who had access to sensitive 
information and repeatedly contacted members of Alterra's sales force. Alterra invested 
substantial resources into training, there are protectable interests at stake, and there is 
evidence of harm from Larson's conduct. Alterra is not seeking to prevent Larson from 
recruiting; it only asks that Larson cease from recruiting Alterra's people and cease from 
disclosing information that he agreed not to disclose. 
ii. The district court did not "re-write" the agreement and an 
employer can protect its relationship with employees. 
Larson's accusation that the district court somehow "re-wrote" the 2015 
Agreement "to include 'clients"' is unfounded. Appellant Br. at 28. Larson makes this 
accusation without identifying where in the 2015 Agreement the district court supposedly 
made this change. His citations to the district court's order are to paragraphs where the 
court discusses irreparable harm, not the meaning of the contract. 
Larson provides no support for his argument that a non-solicitation provision is 
valid only if it prohibits soliciting customers. Appellant Br. at 29. As noted above, 
Alterra has a protectable interest in maintaining a stable workforce and preserving a good 
relationship with its sales representatives. The district court's use of the word "goodwill" 
in discussing that relationship does not undermine its conclusion; the interest is 
protectable, regardless of the term used to describe it. IO 
IO In addition, the two cases cited by Larson are not on point and do not exclude the 
employer-employee relationship from the definition of "goodwill." Peterson v. Jackson, 
2011 UT App 113, ,r 35, 253 P.3d 1096, defined goodwill for purposes of determining the 
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iii. The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a limited 
preliminary injunction. 
A court does not abuse its discretion when it limits the terms of a non-solicitation 
or non-disclosure agreement. System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 427 (revising a restrictive 
covenant to include an unwritten market restriction to avoid the "harsh penalty" of 
rendering the entire covenant void). Larson offers no legal support for his assertion that 
the district court abused its discretion in striking ( or "blue penciling") potentially 
overbroad provisions of the 2015 Agreement. Appellant Br. at 30-31. In fact, Utah's 
practice of limiting or striking potentially problematic terms in employment agreements 
is shared by courts throughout the country. See, e.g., Turnell v. Centimark Corp., 2015 
U.S. App. LEXIS 13230, *13-15 (7th Cir. July 29, 2015) (noting that Pennsylvania 
allows courts to blue pencil restrictive covenants in employment agreements to make 
them enforceable); All Parks Alliance for Change v. Uniprop Mfrd. Hous. Cmtys. Income 
Fund, 732 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. 2007) (approving judicial modification ofnon-
compete agreements "on the theory that in blue-penciling the agreement the court 'is 
merely enforcing the legal parts of a divisible contract"' (quotation omitted)); 
Intermountain Eye & Laser Ctrs., P.L.L.C. v. Miller, 127 P.3d 121, 128 n.2, 131 (Idaho 
fair market value of shares in a public accounting firm. The court in Allen v. Rose Park 
Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 827-28 (Utah 1951), was not asked to examine the employer-
employee relationship. 
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2005) (noting that a court may blue-pencil restrictive covenants and identifying portions 
of the agreement "subject to blue penciling"). 11 
In the present case, the non-solicitation provision prohibits soliciting Alterra's 
~ past, present, and future independent contractors. R.000002-03, 2015 Agr. at~ 13. The 
court determined that the injunction would not apply to past contractors because Alterra's 
interests on that issue could be protected through damages. R.000575, Order at~ 32. 
The Court concluded that the preliminary injunction would not apply to future Alterra 
contractors because it would be difficult to know who they were and because the court 
did not find that soliciting future contractors would cause irreparable harm. Id. ~ 33. To 
the extent that this limitation of a preliminary injunction can be considered a "blue 
pencil" of the agreement, striking the word "future" is a minor change that is well within, 
and entirely consistent with, the district court's power to limit its injunction and avoid the 
"harsh penalty" of rendering the entire covenant void. System Concepts, 669 P .2d at 427. 
The 2015 Agreement's statement that the parties desire that Larson refrain from 
interfering in Alterra' s business is a statement of intent, intended to assist in interpreting 
the Agreement, and is not a covenant. Parties may include a broad statement of intent to 
assist in interpretation without making the contract void for overbreadth. 
11 See also Broadway & Seymour, Inc. v. Wyatt, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 33801, *13-15, 
944 F .2d 900 ( 4th Cir. 1991) (noting that courts may "blue pencil" a covenant not to 
compete to make it reasonable and enforceable); Smart Corp. v. Grider, 650 N.E.2d 80, 
84-85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the court may strike offensive clauses, redacting 
an overbroad geographic restriction, and enforcing the employment agreement). 
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Even if the non-solicitation provision was too broad and Utah did not recognize 
courts' ability to apply limitations, Larson's covenant not to make unauthorized use of 
information related to current Alterra representatives prohibits him from soliciting Alterra 
representatives and providing their information to other summer sales companies. The 
district court heard testimony from four current Alterra representatives who were 
solicited by Larson and contacted by Vivint, who received their information from Larson. 
Three of the four testified that Larsen had their information only by virtue of his 
connections with Alterra. R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg. Tr. at 208 :22-25, 261: 13-22, 295: 19-
296:6. Larson gained their private cell phone numbers through Alterra and can be 
prohibited from using this information to harm Alterra. 
In sum, the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in determining 
that Alterra had shown it was likely to succeed or that there were serious issues on the 
merits of its breach of contract claims. 
B. Alterra Is Likely To Succeed Or Has Shown Serious Issues On The 
Merits Of Its Trade Secret Claim. 
Larson's argument as to the likelihood of success on the trade secret claim is 
limited to whether Alterra's sales force information and compensation plans qualify as 
"trade secrets" under the Uniform Trade Secret Act ("UTSA"). His argument fails for 
two reasons. First, whether information is a trade secret is a question of fact, or at the 
very least, extremely fact intensive, and he has failed to satisfy his burden to marshal the 
evidence that supports the district court's factual findings. Second, even if he had 
marshaled the evidence, the evidence does not show that the district court's factual 
42 
findings were clearly erroneous or that the court abused its discretion in concluding that 
there were serious issues on the merits as to whether the representatives' contact and 
specific compensation information were "trade secrets." 
Information is a trade secret under the UTSA if it: ( 1) "derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being 
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use"; and (2) is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2( 4 ). It is well-settled that a trade secret can include a 
compilation of generally known information. USA Power v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, 
,r 43, 235 P.3d 749 ('"[A] trade secret may include a grouping in which the components 
are in the public domain but there has been accomplished an effective, successful and 
valuable integration of those public elements such that the owner derives a competitive 
advantage from it."' (quoting Enter. Leasing Co. v. Ehmke, 3 P.3d 1064, 1069 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1999))). Lists of information, such as customer and employee contact information, 
methods, and pricing can be a trade secret. Hammerton v. Heisterman, 2008 WL 
~ 2004327 at *8 (D. Utah May 9, 2008) (holding that the plaintiff presented sufficient 
evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether a customer list was a trade secret). 
Ultimately, "' [ w ]hat constitutes a trade secret is a question of fact."' CDC 
Restoration & Const., LC v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 2012 UT App 60, ,r 13,274 
P.3d 317 (quoting Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487,494 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994)). Whether information "constitutes a trade secret is an intensely factual inquiry to 
be conducted by the trial court" based on a non-exclusive list of factors. Id. at ,r 45. 
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These factors include: the extent to which the information is known to those within and 
outside the company, the measures taken by the company to guard the information, the 
value of the information to the company and its competitors, the effort and cost expended 
in gathering the information, the ease or difficulty with which others could acquire the 
information. USA Power, 2010 UT 31, at 145. 
1. Larson's UTSA challenge should be dismissed for failure to 
marshal the evidence. 
As noted in Section I, "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Whether something qualifies as a trade secret is a question of fact. CDC Restoration, 
2012 UT App 60 at,, 13, 45. Larson challenges the district court's factual findings that 
Alterra's employee and specific compensation information fall within the definition of 
trade secret without marshaling any of the evidence that could support this finding. 
Instead, Larson presents some evidence that could support his preferred conclusion. This 
is not sufficient. It is not the appellate court's job to comb through the record and 
determine whether the findings lack evidentiary support. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, at 
120 n.5. Larson has not satisfied his burden of marshaling the evidence and thus cannot 
challenge the district court's conclusion as to the likelihood of success on Alterra's 
UTSA claim. 
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2. Even if Larson h~d met his marshaling burden, Alterra did 
show likelihood of success or, at the very least, that there are 
serious issues on the merits of whether the information at issue is 
a trade secret. 
Compilations of information, including customer and employee information, can 
be a trade secret. USA Power, 2010 UT 31, at il 43; Hammerton, 2008 WL 2004327 at 
*8. During the hearing, Alterra presented evidence that it derived economic value from 
lei) the confidential nature of its representatives' contact and specific compensation 
information and that it took reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-24-2(4). 
Specifically, the district court heard evidence on the fiercely competitive nature of 
the summer sales industry 12 and the importance of Alterra' s independent contractors to its 
entire business model. 13 Alterra presented evidence showing the great effort and expense 
it incurs to find, recruit, train, and retain its sales representatives. 14 Alterra presented 
evidence showing that it derives economic value from lists of names and contact 
information of its sales representatives and strives to retain them. 15 The district also 
heard that Larson offered an Alterra representative $200 just for the opportunity to meet 
with him. 16 Because independent contractors are so vital to the summer sales industry, 
Alterra takes steps to protect independent contractor information and specific 
compensation information. Alterra presented evidence that it protects this information by 
12 R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg. Tr. 57:12-21. 
13 Id. 38:25-29:16, 51:9-22, 53:5-54:5, 55:3-56:6; see also R.000576-77, Order at ilil 23, 
27. 
14 R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg. Tr. at 43:14-47:10; 47:11-51:22. 
15 Id. at 51:9-52:10. 
16 Id. at 285: 11-14; R.000288; R.000293, ilil 5-6. 
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storing it in customized, proprietary software, 17 limiting access, 18 and requiring 
independent contractors and employees to sign contracts covenanting to keep the 
information confidential. 19 The district court also heard evidence that disclosure of 
specific compensation would hurt Alterra by requiring it to increase compensation 
percentages or risk losing key sales people and that Alterra does what it can to protect 
this information. 20 
Larson's argument that specific compensation information cannot be a trade secret 
because Alterra does not do enough to protect it is simply incorrect. It is undisputed that 
general compensation information is not a trade secret, but specific compensation plans 
are not disclosed and are protected by non-disclosure agreements. Contrary to Larson's 
assertion, it is not a simple matter to discover this information. In order to reverse 
engineer the specific compensation percentages of a particular representative, a person 
must know: (1) Alterra's compensation system, (2) the number of sales made by that 
particular representative, (3) the number of sales made by everyone in his downline, and 
( 4) that representative's total compensation. This information is not public. Alterra does 
not publish the number of sales made by a representative and those in his downline. At 
the hearing, various sales representatives testified that they did not want their specific 
compensation information disclosed. R.000576, Order at 125. 
17 R.000813 at 44:18-21. 
18 Id. at 189:12-13. 
19 Id. at51:23-52:10. 
20 Id. at 53:1-54:5, 56:7-57:11, 189:12-13. 
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Alterra derives economic value from this information and takes reasonable steps to 
maintain its secrecy. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
Alterra had presented sufficient evidence to show a likelihood of success or serious issues 
on the merits of its trade secret claim. 
C. Alterra Demonstrated Irreparable Harm. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held '"[t]hat injunctive relief is an anticipatory 
remedy purposed to prevent the perpetration of a threatened wrong or to compel the 
cessation of a continuing one."' System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 428 (quoting Anderson v. 
Granite Sch. Dist., 413 P.2d 597, 599 (Utah 1966)). '"[I]rreparable harm' justifying a 
preliminary injunction includes 'wrongs of a repeated and continuing character, or which 
occasion damages that are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate 
standard."' Hunsaker v. Kersh, 1999 UT 106, ,r 9, 991 P .2d 67 ( quoting System 
Concepts, 669 P.2d at 427). A trade secret is a property right that is "protected by a legal 
presumption of harm." InnoSys, Inc. v. Mercer, 2015 UT 80, ,r 33, 794 Utah Adv. Rep. 
95. "A long-settled principle of trade secret law recognizes a presumption of harm upon 
proof of misappropriation." Id. at ,r 34. Thus, once the plaintiff shows disclosure of a 
trade secret, irreparable harm is presumed and the defendant bears the burden of proving 
no harm. In claims that do not involve disclosure of trade secrets, a plaintiff satisfies its 
burden of showing irreparable harm by showing "the likely or threatened occurrence of 
such harm and the irreparability thereof." System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 428. 
It is undisputed that Larson disclosed the names, private contact information, and 
specific compensation information for Alterra representatives. Larson has not properly 
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challenged the finding that this is a trade secret; thus, irreparable harm is presumed. In 
addition, the district court heard evidence and concluded that Larson's repeated and 
successful attempts to convince Alterra's sales people to break their contracts with 
Alterra and the disclosure of specific compensation information harmed and threatened to 
harm Alterra. R.000575, Order at 1130-31. The conduct threatened Alterra's sales 
force, created tension among its sales team, hurt Alterra's reputation, and damaged the 
relationship between Alterra and its representatives. Id. 1122-23, 25-31. Another factor, 
though not determinative, was the parties' acknowledgment in the 2015 Agreement that 
breach of the non-solicitation and non-disclosure provisions would constitute irreparable 
harm. Id. 129. These are repeated and threatened injuries that justify the anticipatory 
remedy of a preliminary injunction. 
Larson does not dispute the district court's factual findings and his failure to 
marshal the evidence in support of the district court's conclusion precludes him from 
making such an argument. Instead, he labels the district court's factual findings as 
"speculation" and re-argues the merits of his legal challenges. 
Larson's "speculation" argument is based on the lone fact that he could have 
terminated his position as an Alterra independent contractor at any time, but this ignores 
the fact that the non-solicitation and non-disclosure provisions survived the termination 
of the 2015 Agreement. Alterra had every reason to expect Larson to abide by these 
covenants. In addition, Alterra rightly relied on Larson's representations that he would 
work and recruit for Alterra for the 2015 summer sales season. Larson repeatedly 
represented that he would stay with Alterra and Alterra had been paying him $7,000 per 
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month and other advances with the expectation that Larson would continue working for 
Alterra and have another successful summer. Larson's argument also ignores the very 
real harm that Alterra undisputedly suffered as a result of Larson recruiting its 
~ salespeople and sharing specific compensation information. R.000575-77, Order at 
,, 22-23, 25-31. 
Addressing Larson's merits arguments, as discussed above, the case law makes 
clear that a company does have a protectable interest in maintaining a good relationship 
with its employees and independent contractors,21 the 2014 Addendum did not supersede 
the 2015 Agreement, 22 and Alterra took reasonable steps to protect specific compensation 
• -C'. • 23 m1ormation. 
D. The Balance Of Harms Weighs in Alterra's Favor. 
Larson's objections to the district court's balance of the equities should be 
disregarded for his failure to marshal the evidence relied on by the district court. Rather 
than marshal the evidence presented to the district court, he incorporates the legal 
arguments presented earlier in his brief. An examination of the facts and evidence 
vj presented at the two-day hearing demonstrates that the district court's factual findings 
were not clearly erroneous and it did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the 
limited injunction would not harm Larson while refusal to issue the injunction would 
cause significant harm to Alterra. 
21 See Section II(A)(3)(i), supra. 
22 See Section Il(A)(2)(iii)-(iv), supra. 
23 See Section II(B)(2), supra. 
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Balancing the competing equities is a fact-intensive inquiry that justifies giving 
the district court broader discretion. Cf Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ,r 11, 222 
P.3d 69 ("[B]ecause of the fact-intensive nature of equitable doctrines, we grant the trial 
court broader discretion in applying the law to the facts."). In the present case, Alterra 
presented substantial evidence of the harm it would suffer if Larson were allowed to 
continue soliciting, or assisting Vivint to solicit, Alterra's key salespeople and disclosing 
specific compensation information in his attempts to draw away Alterra's representatives. 
Specifically, Alterra presented evidence that: 
• Alterra invests a lot of time, money, and other resources in finding, 
interviewing, vetting, and training its sales representatives and loses its 
investment when representatives leave. R.000813, Feb. 11 Hrg Tr. at 
44:5-51 :22; 
• Alterra incurrs expenses to set up offices and purchase trucks and supplies 
based on the number of sales representatives and would suffer significant 
waste if those representatives were recruited away. Id. at 39:4-41 :12; 
• Larson solicited Alterra representatives and gave their private cell phone 
numbers to Vivint in an effort to recruit away Alterra's salespeople. Id. at 
217:22-218: 12; 266:24-267: 17; 
• Alterra was harmed when Larson convinced two key people to leave 
Alterra for another summer sales company, which required Alterra to 
increase their compensation above that of their colleagues in order to win 
them back. 1d. at 279:8-24; R. 00328, Deel. J. Bennington at ,r 16; 
• Larson is a skilled recruiter and is able to recruit for Vivint without 
targeting Alterra's salespeople. R.000813 at 329:17-18; 349:15-23. 
The district court concluded that Larson's conduct irreparably harmed Alterra. 
R.000575-77, Order at ,r,r 22-23, 25-31. In contrast, there is no evidence that Larson is 
harmed by excluding the few hundred current Alterra sales representatives from his 
recruiting pool. To the contrary, he testified that he is "an incredible recruiter" and could 
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be successful without resorting to stealing Alterra's people. Larson does not dispute the 
VJV 
district court's finding that he has a significant pool of "high-quality talent" from which 
he can recruit. Id. 136. Larson's assertion that the court "ignored the time and money 
~ Mr. Larson already invested by January 2015 in recruiting for Alterra" is made without 
any citation to the record because Larson did not present evidence of time or money he 
spent recruiting for Alterra. He cannot accuse the district court of ignoring non-existent 
evidence. 
The preliminary injunction does not prohibit Larson from pursuing his occupation 
or recruiting any person that he knows, it simply requires him to leave Alterra's people 
alone. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the balance of 
equities weighed in favor of Alterra. 
E. An Injunction Is Not Adverse To The Public. 
Larson waived his public interest argument by not presenting reasoned argument 
supported by facts and case law. Spafford, 2011 UT App 401 at 11 24-25. If Larson 
presents such arguments in his reply, Alterra respectfully requests the opportunity to 
address any argument, case law, or characterization of the facts that he may present. 
It is undisputed that Utah has a preference for enforcing contracts. The district 
court correctly noted that courts across the country have distinguished between non-
compete provisions on one hand and non-disclosure and non-solicitation clauses on the 
other, often upholding non-solicitation clauses as only slight restrictions with no negative 
impact on trade. See Cases cited in Section I(A)(3)(i). Larson does not dispute the 
factual finding that he has a large pool of high quality talent from which he can recruit or 
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that removing the few hundred Alterra sales people from his substantial recruiting pool 
would not significantly impact his ability to earn a living. He does not explain how this 
slight restriction is adverse to the public. 
In short, Larson has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in 
finding that a limited preliminary injunction was not adverse to the public interest. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
enjoining Larson from soliciting Alterra's representatives and disclosing Alterra 
representatives' contact and specific compensation information. The district court's grant <t; 
of the preliminary injunction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of Septem 
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actions and i n the testimony show that he was not to 
solicit any representatives of Alterra i f he went to 
go work for another door-to-door sales company. 
He can go work, just don't go solicit 
Alterra people. That's what we ask. And we thank 
you for your consideration. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Okay. I'm going to take a recess here to 
deliberate on this. I should be back in in about 20 
minutes. So maybe about 25 'til 1:00. 
Okay. So Court's in recess. 
MR. BOREN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Thank you. 
THE BAILIFF: All rise. 
(Recess taken.) 
THE BAILIFF: All rise. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. 
Those present when the court recessed are 
again present. 
The Court's ready to enter its findings 
and conclusions on this matter. 
I would app-- I do appreciate the 
preparation of counsel. I know these are 
short-notice matters, and I felt that counsel were 




























circumstances, and courteous to the witnesses under 
the circumstances. 
So the Court rules as follows: 
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The parties entered sales agreements 
between 2013 and 2015. The agreements did allow the 
defendant to terminate the agreement, essentially at 
will, but did impose conditions on termination, such 
as having to pay back advances, and also having to 
comply with restrictive covenants. 
The par-- the agreements did have 
restrictive covenants. For example, paragraph 13 
prevents solicitation, including during the term of 
the agreement, plus 38 months thereafter after the 
contractual agreement terminates. 
The -- paragraph 14 prevents the 
disclosure of defined trade secrets. 
There was also an addendum to the 2014 --
2015 agreement, but it it -- it actually doesn't 
supercede, but rather, by its express terms, 
incorporates the terms of the 2014 agreement. 
The parties did exchange promises in 
connection with these agreements, and subsequently 
exchanged services of money. 
That the defendant did leave the company, 




























contemporaneously with leaving, did attempt to 
solicit away several of plaintiff's contractors, 
which is potentially restricted by paragraph 13. 
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The defendant also disclosed compensation 
plan information and contact information to other 
people, including specific compensation information 
to employees of -- or, not employees, but to 
contractors of plaintiff, and also contact 
information to an employee of his new company. 
The defendant is working at the new 
company and continues working there and recruiting 
there. 
The current contract identifies the 
acknowledgment of the parties that summer sales 
companies are competitive and, regardless of the 
industry, recruit from the same talent pool. 
It also addresses -- then addresses, in 
proximity to that statement, the non-solicitation 
provisions. 
Based on these provisions, the clause 
applies to defendant working for another company 
involved in summer sales and recruiting -- recruiting 
away -- potentially in conflict with paragraph 13, 






























The plaintiff is not precluded from relief 
if it's granted here by unclean hands. It is not 
bound by a contract prohibiting it from soliciting 
from other companies. So it's in a different 
situation than defendant is. 
Defendant has acted contrary to the terms 
of the contract by -- as stated above. 
So turning to the factors that one 
considers in determining whether there should be a 
preliminary injunction issued. First looking at the 
issue of likelihood of success on the merits, or 
serious issues on the merits for further litigation, 
13(i) does say or 13(ii) does say that you can't 
recruit plaintiff's contractors, and the express 
intent between the parties in the agreement is not to 
interfere with Alterra's business. We've talked 
about what that 
business is. 
we've talked about what that 
Also, there is a difference between the 
ability to go to another company and work there, 
which all -- or I should say recruiting there as a 
contractor or as an employee, which all of Alterra's 
contractors are free to do -- there's a difference 
between that and then -- but also recruiting others, 





























I would distinguish the TruGreen case on 
this issue as prohibiting such a covenant, since that 
was a noncompete case and it's different than a 
non-solicitation case. 
Further, 14 specifically identifies trade 
secrets. It defines them as including things such as 
compensation plans, contacts, customer lists. And so 
it also -- so based on that, there is, at the very 
least -- there are, at the very least, serious issues 
on the merits for further litigation. 
And this idea of a likelihood of success 
on the merits, I mean, you know, we're not Sears. We 
can't tell who's going to prevail in a case. 
Sometimes you can't even tell who's likely to prevail 
until you get down the road with discovery. 
So this provision has always bothered me, 
and it's always treated in a fairly summary matter in 
the appellate cases. You don't really see a real big 
analysis of this prong. 
But nevertheless, it's in there, it's 
something that's come out of case law, and it's been 
incorporated into our rule. 
And so just -- I just want to make clear 
that by saying there's a likelihood of success on the 




























side's going to prevail over the other in the end, 
because the fact is, we don't know -- we don't know 
who's going to prevail. 
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I mean, that's -- so I don't think that 
means that I'm making a forecast of -- of who's going 
to prevail in this case, it just means that. yeah. 
there -- there's a likelihood that, however --
however strong, the plaintiff's could -- could 
prevail in this case. 
Of course, it 1 s also -- it 1 s also possible 
that defendant could prevail in this case. We'll 
have to see what happens when all the facts come out. 
We -- we haven't heard everything. obviously. in this 
summary proceeding. 
Regarding public policy. If a preliminary 
injunction did issue, it would not it would not 
violate any public policy that I 1 m aware of. 
First let me talk about enforcing 
contractual covenants. We clearly have a preference 
in this state for -- for doing that. 
With regard to imposing restrictions on 
ability -- on ability to work, or anything like that, 
I'll address that in a minute. But we're not 
dealing, again. with a noncompete clause here, and so 





























preliminary injunction in this case. 
So let's turn to the issue of irreparable 
harm, and then we'll go on to balancing the equities. 
First of all, with respect to the 
disclosure of information, the Trade Secrets Act 
pretty well takes care of the issue on disclosure of 
the information that's been defined as as trade 
secrets. That would be the -- that would be the --
the payment plans. 
But, on the other hand, the parties 
haven't treated the general compensation plan as a 
trade secret. I mean, it's shown at the -- at the 
recruitment fairs and things like that. I really 
don't see where just the general compensation plan 
could be a trade secret. 
However, what I will enjoin as a trade 
secret is the specific numbers, the compensation of 
each employee. 
Number one, that would -- creates 
irreparable harm because it does interfere with the 
goodwill between the company and its -- I -- I keep 
calling them employees, but they're independent 
contractors. 
And that's probably much of a result of 





























people who would otherwise be considered employees 
who are scared to death to do that, so we make them 
independent contractors so we don't have to give them 
ObamaCare and so forth. But that's beside the point. 
Independent contractors. 
The company has goodwill between it and 
its clients. And its clients would not only be the 
customers that eventually buy its pest control 
services, but the independent contractors who it has 
this relationship with and on whom it depends to 
to continue its business, this business of summer 
sales. 
And so -- so -- so putting out this 
information, number one, would violate Trade Secrets 
Act. 
And I would note that the case that -- we 
did look up the case that the plaintiffs cited, the 
supreme court case, CD whatever it was. 
MR. BOREN: CDC. 
THE COURT: CDC case. And it -- it did 
say that the parties can define trade secrets. I 
guess they could even define somebody's shoe size as 
a trade secret, evidently, and the legislature says 
it's a trade secret if they've defined it that way in 




























And so -- so they can·t disclose the 
specific pay information, number one. 
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There would be irreparable harm even if we 
didn 1 t have the Trade Secrets Act, and even if it 
weren•t defined, because that would -- could create 
conflict between the company and its independent 
contractors. 
You know, we•ve had some of them who have 
testified that they're not really happy with their 
personal pay information going out to everybody. 
Also, the other thing would be that the 
contact information, to the extent that that•s not 
public, that contact information cannot be taken from 
the files of -- of the plaintiff and distributed. 
However, obviously if it's on the 
Internet, that's not -- that·s not somebody else 
can get that from that source, but it can·t be taken 
from that. 
Now, you ask, how do we know -- how do we 
know if somebody's getting information from the 
company files or from the Internet? 
I don•t know, but that·s all it can extend 
to. 
Now, the idea also on the recruitment 





























between the plaintiff and its clients or contractors. 
And further, all of this -- because if --
if people are able to solicit away its contractors, 
it does create a tension of goodwill and -- and 
impinges on the goodwill between what it's trying to 
develop and essentially its client base of potential 
sales people. 
And so goodwill. is simply something that 
you can't easily define in terms of monetary damages, 
and therefore would -- would be a subject for --
would be the sub-- would fit within the definition of 
irreparable harm. 
And I would also note that the contractual 
terms which define this as irreparable harm would 
also be a factor, although not de-- not a decisive 
issue, but it would be a factor. 
And there again, we have this case out of 
the Tenth Circuit that says the contract -- relying 
on the contract itself cannot be -- cannot create 
irreparable harm, but it can be one of the factors. 
And I don't know how workable that is for a trial 
court to get into that. Okay? We can't -- we can't 
use it for irreparable harm, but we can use it for 
irreparable harm as one of the factors. 




























parties intended that -- that -- that the 
solicitation would be irreparable harm if the 
solicitation continues. And so -- so that would be 
another factor. 
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Also, the fact that some of these people 
are key sales people, regional directors, division 
directors, and so forth, would, under the Utah case 
law, indicate that -- that that would be grounds 
for -- for for an injunction. 
Finally, the nature of the repeated 
contacts. We've had several contractors for 
plaintiff who have come in and testified about them 
being solicited. Those repeated contacts would be 
factors in justifying a finding of irreparable harm 
and an eventual injunction. 
So the Court finds that with respect to 
the solicitation of current contractors --
I'm not talking about past contractors, 
that would be an issue for damages in the future, or 
future contractors, because, number one, we don't 
really know who they are; and, number two, I don't 
know how -- I don't know -- I -- I can't really see 
any irreparable harm if people are competing for 
contractors in the same college and -- and then --




























doesn't. I really don't see how that constitutes 
irreparable harm, it's simply competition for a 
contractor, whoever makes them the best deal. 
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Now, if we said future contractors, that 
would essentially prohibit the defendant from going 
to a college and recruiting return missionaries, for 
example, and the Court really can't -- the Court 
believes that that would be too broad of an 
interpretation of -- or too broad of a restriction 
on -- on -- on defendant. That's I don't think 
that's what the parties would have intended. 
So -- so they can't -- they can't recruit 
the current contractors of the plaintiff. Defendant 
can't do that. 
He also can't share the information that's 
been defined as a trade secret in the contract 
because of the Trade Secrets Act. If it wasn't for 
that act, then we'd have a different response. All 
those issues -- everything else would be an issue for 
damages in the future or for trial. 
Now, balancing the equities in this case, 
I don't believe that the equities in defendant's half 
would predominate. And here's why: 
First and foremost, I do note that the 




























defendant did something that he agreed not to do by 
soliciting these these contractors away. 
Some of that would be reparable in 
damages, as I mentioned, but there would be damages 
also. But I think that the big impact is on the 
goodwill and reputation of plaintiff, and so there 
are significant equities on the plaintiff's side. 
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On defendant's side, he is able to work 
for another company. There are probably -- I don't 
know, in -- in this area, there are probably a 
hundred thousand returned missionaries, for example, 
he could recruit from. And -- and of those, probably 
75,000 were trainers, probably 50,000 were zone 
leaders or district leaders, if not more, and 
probably 5,000 were associates -- were assistants to 
the president. 
So there's really a lot of high-quality 
talent out there that's available to be -- to be 
approached and recruited from. 
And so I don't believe that not being able 
to recruit the sixty -- 60 or 70 people away from the 
the plaintiff is a significant hardship in 
compar-- when when looked at in -- in -- in 
comparison to the extensive rooting -- extensive 





























And I know he goes from door to door and 
recruits, but it appears he could also -- there's 
nothing to stop him from recruiting. 
And he says he doesn't know how to find 
out who these returned missionaries are whom he can 
recruit. 
Well, the Court would take judicial 
probably nine-tenths of or at least eight-tenths 
of anybody you're going to run to -- run into around 
here, age twenty -- age 22 to 25, would be in the age 
range that they're looking at and would be somebody 
that would have potential to sell. 
And so based on that. I believe -- I don't 
believe that we're preventing defendant from earning 
a living with this injunction, we're just preventing 
him from going to the people who are presently under 
contract with plaintiff and soliciting them away. 
Also, again, we don't really have to 
balance the equities on the trade secret disclosure, 
because the Trade Secret Act takes care of that. But 
I really don't see where him not being able to use 
the pay contracts of the Alterra contractors would 
have a significant impact on his ability to recruit 
others, because he does have a pay package from his 





























the current company that he's working with and he'll 
be able to use that to recruit. 
So I am going to -- since this matter will 
create a potential for damages, though, if defendant 
is to prevail, I am going to order that a $50,000 
surety bond -- $50,000 total surety bond be in place, 
or cash be in place, with the Court to indemnify him 
from the impacts of this injunction in the future 
should it turn out this injunction should not have 
been issued, or if it -- if it is set aside at trial. 
Court. 
And so that will be the order of the 
Any questions on what I've ordered? 
MR . KARRENBERG : No , s i r . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOREN: No. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Would -- would plaintiff's counsel please 
prepare an order and run that by the defense counsel? 
And 





then, a couple of things. 
file a - - an answer here 
something in a couple 
KARRENBERG: Yes, s i r . 
COURT: Okay. 
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